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Automatic Abstraction in SMT-Based
Unbounded Software Model Checking ⋆
Anvesh Komuravelli, Arie Gurfinkel, Sagar Chaki, and Edmund M. Clarke
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Abstract. Software model checkers based on under-approximations and
SMT solvers are very successful at verifying safety (i.e., reachability)
properties. They combine two key ideas – (a) concreteness: a counterex-
ample in an under-approximation is a counterexample in the original
program as well, and (b) generalization: a proof of safety of an under-
approximation, produced by an SMT solver, are generalizable to proofs of
safety of the original program. In this paper, we present a combination of
automatic abstraction with the under-approximation-driven framework.
We explore two iterative approaches for obtaining and refining abstrac-
tions – proof based and counterexample based – and show how they can
be combined into a unified algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first application of Proof-Based Abstraction, primarily used to ver-
ify hardware, to Software Verification. We have implemented a prototype
of the framework using Z3, and evaluate it on many benchmarks from
the Software Verification Competition. We show experimentally that our
combination is quite effective on hard instances.
1 Introduction
Algorithms based on generalizing from under-approximations are very successful
at verifying safety properties, i.e., absence of bad executions (e.g., [2,11,27]).
Those techniques use what we call a Bounded Model Checking-Based Model
Checking (2BMC). The key idea of 2BMC is to iteratively construct an under-
approximation U of the target program P by unwinding its transition relation
and check whether U is safe using Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [8]. If U
is unsafe, so is P . Otherwise, a proof πU is produced explaining why U is safe.
Finally, πU is generalized (if possible) to a safety proof of P . Notable instances of
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0: x=0; y=0; z=0; w=0;
1: while(*) {
2: if(*) {x++; y=y+100;}
3: else if(*)
4: if (x>=4) {x++; y++;}
5: else if(y>10*w &&
z>=100*x)
6: {y=-y;}
7: t=1;
8: w=w+t; z=z+(10*t);
}
9: assert(!(x>=4 && y<=2));
Fig. 1: A program Pg by Gulavani et al. [19].
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Fig. 2: An overview of Spacer.
2BMC are based on interpolation (e.g., [2,27]) or Property Directed Reachability
(PDR) [10,14] (e.g., [11,22]).
At the same time, automatic abstraction refinement, such as CounterEx-
ample Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) [12], is very effective [2,7,21].
The idea is to iteratively construct, verify, and refine an abstraction (i.e., an
over-approximation) of P based on abstract counterexamples. In this paper, we
present Spacer1, an algorithm that combines abstraction with 2BMC.
For example, consider the safe program Pg by Gulavani et al. [19] shown in
Fig. 1. Pg is hard for existing 2BMC techniques. For example, µZ engine of
Z3 [13] (v4.3.1) that implements Generalized PDR [22] cannot solve it within
an hour. However, its abstraction Pˆg obtained by replacing line 7 with a non-
deterministic assignment to t is solved by the same engine in under a second. Our
implementation of Spacer finds a safe abstraction of Pg in under a minute (the
transition relation of the abstraction we automatically computed is a non-trivial
generalization of that of Pg and does not correspond to Pˆg).
Spacer tightly connects proof-based (PBA) and counterexample-based (CE-
GAR) abstraction-refinement schemes. An overview of Spacer is shown in
Fig. 2. The input is a program P with a designated error location er and the
output is either SAFE with a proof that er is unreachable, or UNSAFE with a
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counterexample to er. Spacer is sound, but obviously incomplete, i.e., it is not
guaranteed to terminate.
During execution, Spacer maintains an abstraction A of P , and an under-
approximation U of A. We require that the safety problem for U is decidable. So,
U is obtained by considering finitely many finitary executions of A. Initially, A is
any abstraction of P (or P itself) and U is some under-approximation (step 1) of
A. In each iteration, the main decision engine, called Solve, takes U and outputs
either a proof πU of safety (as an inductive invariant) or a counterexample trace
CU of U (step 2). In practice, Solve is implemented by an interpolating SMT-
solver (e.g., [18,24]), or a generalized Horn Clause solver (e.g., [29,17,22]). If
U is safe and πU is also valid for P (step 3), Spacer terminates with SAFE;
otherwise, it constructs a new abstraction Aˆ (step 4) using πU , picks an under-
approximation Uˆ of Aˆ (step 1), and goes into the next iteration. If U is unsafe
and CU is a feasible trace of P (step 5), Spacer terminates with UNSAFE;
otherwise, it refines the under-approximation U to refute CU (step 6) and goes
to the next iteration. Spacer is described in Section 4 and a detailed run of the
algorithm on an example is given in Section 2.
Note that the left iteration of Spacer (steps 1, 2, 3, 4) is PBA: in each
iteration, an under-approximation is solved, a new abstraction based on the
proof is computed and a new under-approximation is constructed. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first application of PBA to Software Model Checking.
The right iteration (steps 1, 2, 5, 6) is CEGAR: in each iteration, (an under-
approximation of) an abstraction is solved and refined by eliminating spurious
counterexamples. Spacer exploits the natural duality between the two.
While Spacer is not complete, each iteration makes progress either by prov-
ing safety of a bigger under-approximation, or by refuting a spurious counterex-
ample. Thus, when resources are exhausted, Spacer can provide useful informa-
tion for other verification attempts and for increasing confidence in the program.
We have implemented Spacer using µZ [22] as Solve (Section 5) and eval-
uated it on many benchmarks from the 2nd Software Verification Competition2
(SV-COMP’13). Our experimental results (see Section 6) show that the combi-
nation of 2BMC and abstraction outperforms 2BMC on hard benchmarks.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions: (a) an algorithm,
Spacer, that combines abstraction and 2BMC and tightly connects proof- and
counterexample-based abstractions, (b) an implementation of Spacer using µZ
engine of Z3 and (c) experimental results showing the effectiveness of Spacer.
2 Overview
In this section, we illustrate Spacer on the program P shown in Fig. 3(a).
Function nd() returns a value non-deterministically and assume(0) aborts an
execution. Thus, at least one of the updates on lines 3, 4 and 5 must take place
in every iteration of the loop on line 2. Note that the variable c counts down
2 http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org
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0: x=0; y=0; z=0; w=0; c=nd();
1: b=nd();
2: while (0<c<=b) {
3: if (nd()) {x++; y=y+100;}
4: else if (nd() && x>=4) {x++; y++;}
5: else if (y>10*w && z>=100*x) {y=-y;}
6: else assume (0);
7: w++; z=z+10; c--;
}
8: assert (!(c==0 && x>=4 && y<=2));
(a)
en lp er
I
T
E
I ≡ (x′ = y′ = z′ = w′ = 0)
T ≡ [(x′ = x + 1 ∧ y′ = y + 100) ∨
(x ≥ 4 ∧ x′ = x+ 1 ∧ y′ = y + 1) ∨
(y > 10w ∧ z ≥ 100x ∧
y′ = −y ∧ x′ = x)] ∧
w′ = w + 1 ∧ z′ = z + 10 ∧
0 < c ≤ b ∧ c′ = c− 1
E ≡ c = 0 ∧ x ≥ 4 ∧ y ≤ 2
(b)
Fig. 3: (a) A program P and (b) its transition system.
the number of iterations of the loop to 0, upper bounded by b. A restriction
to b is an under-approximation of P . For example, adding ‘assume(b<=0);’
to line 1 corresponds to the under-approximation of P that allows only loop-
free executions; adding ‘assume(b<=1);’ to line 1 corresponds to the under-
approximation that allows at most one execution through the loop, etc. While
in this example the counter variable c is part of P , we synthesize such variables
automatically in practice (see Section 5).
Semantically, P is given by the transition system shown in Fig 3(b). The
control locations en, lp, and er correspond to lines 0, 2, and 8 in P , respectively.
An edge from ℓ1 to ℓ2 corresponds to all loop-free executions starting at ℓ1
and ending at ℓ2. For example, the self-loop on lp corresponds to the body of
the loop. Finally, every edge is labeled by a formula over current (unprimed)
and next-state (primed) variables denoting the semantics of the corresponding
executions. Hence, I and E denote the initial and error conditions, respectively,
and T denotes the loop body. In the rest of the paper, we do not distinguish
between semantic and syntactic representations of programs.
Our goal is to find a safety proof for P , i.e., a labeling π of en, lp and er with a
set of formulas (called lemmas) that satisfies safety, initiation and inductiveness:
∧
π(er)⇒ ⊥, ⊤ ⇒
∧
π(en), ∀ℓ1, ℓ2 
(∧
π(ℓ1) ∧ τ(ℓ1, ℓ2)
)
⇒
∧
π(ℓ2)
′.
where τ(ℓ1, ℓ2) is the label of edge from ℓ1 to ℓ2, and for an expression X , X
′ is
obtained from X by priming all variables. In the following, we refer to Fig. 2 for
the steps of the algorithm.
Steps 1 and 2. Let U1 be the under-approximation obtained from P by con-
joining (b ≤ 2) to T . It is safe, and suppose that Solve returns the safety proof
π1, shown in Fig. 5(a).
Step 3. To check whether π1 is also a safety proof of the concrete program P ,
we extract a Maximal Inductive Subset (MIS), I1 (shown in Fig. 5(b)), of π1,
with respect to P . That is, for every location ℓ, I1(ℓ) ⊆ π1(ℓ), and I1 satisfies
the initiation and inductiveness conditions above. I1 is an inductive invariant
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Iˆ1 ≡ (x
′ = y′ = z′ = w′ = 0)
Tˆ1 ≡ [(x
′ = x + 1) ∨
(x ≥ 4 ∧ x′ = x + 1) ∨
(y > 10w ∧ z ≥ 100x)] ∧
0 < c ≤ b ∧ c′ = c− 1
Eˆ1 ≡ c = 0 ∧ x ≥ 4
(a) Pˆ1
Iˆ2 ≡ (x
′ = y′ = z′ = w′ = 0)
Tˆ2 ≡ [(x
′ = x + 1 ∧ y′ = y + 100) ∨
(x ≥ 4 ∧ x′ = x + 1 ∧ y′ = y + 1) ∨
(y > 10w ∧ z ≥ 100x)] ∧
0 < c ≤ b ∧ c′ = c− 1
Eˆ2 ≡ c = 0 ∧ x ≥ 4 ∧ y ≤ 2
(b) Pˆ2
Fig. 4: Abstractions Pˆ1 and Pˆ2 of P in Fig. 3(b).
en : {}
lp : {(z ≤ 100x− 90 ∨
y ≤ 10w),
z ≤ 100x, x ≤ 2
(x ≤ 0 ∨ c ≤ 1)
(x ≤ 1 ∨ c ≤ 0)}
er : {⊥}
(a) π1: safety proof of U1.
en : {}
lp : {(z ≤ 100x− 90 ∨
y ≤ 10w),
z ≤ 100x}
er : {}
(b) I1: invariants of P .
en : {}
lp : {(z ≤ 100x− 90 ∨
y ≤ 10w),
z ≤ 100x, y ≥ 0,
(x ≤ 0 ∨ y ≥ 100)}
er : {⊥}
(c) π3: safety proof of U3.
Fig. 5: Proofs and invariants for the running example in Section 2.
of P , but is not safe (er is not labeled with ⊥). Hence, π1 does not contain a
feasible proof, and another iteration of Spacer is required.
Step 4. We obtain an abstraction Pˆ1 of P for which, assuming the invariants
in I1, π1 is a safety proof for the first two iterations of the loop (i.e., when
b ≤ 2). For this example, let Pˆ1 be as shown in Fig. 4(b). Note that Tˆ1 has no
constraints on the next-state values of z, y and w. This is okay for π1 as I1(lp)
already captures the necessary relation between these variables. In other words,
while Tˆ1 is a structural (or syntactic) abstraction [6], we consider its restriction
to the invariants I1 making it a more expressive, semantic abstraction. The next
iteration of Spacer is described below.
Steps 1 and 2. Let U2 be the under-approximation obtained from Pˆ1 by conjoin-
ing (b ≤ 4)∧I1∧I
′
1 to Tˆ1. It is not safe and let Solve return a counterexample C2
as the pair 〈ℓ¯, s¯〉 of the following sequences of locations and states, corresponding
to incrementing x from 0 to 4 with an unconstrained y:
ℓ¯ ≡ 〈en, lp, lp, lp, lp, lp, er〉
s¯ ≡ 〈(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4), (1, 0, 0, 0, 3, 4), (2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 4),
(3, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4), (4, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4), (4, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4)〉
(1)
where a state is a valuation to the tuple (x, y, z, w, c, b).
Steps 5 and 6. C2 is infeasible in P as the last state does not satisfy E. Pˆ1 is
refined to Pˆ2, say as shown in Fig. 4(b), by adding the missing constraints on y.
Steps 1 and 2. Let U3 be the under-approximation obtained from Pˆ2 by con-
joining (b ≤ 4) ∧ I1 ∧ I
′
1 to Tˆ2. It is safe, and let Solve return the proof π3
shown in Fig. 5(c).
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Step 3. π3 is a MIS of itself, with respect to P . Thus, it is a safety proof for P
and Spacer terminates.
While we have carefully chosen the under-approximations to save space,
the abstractions, lemmas and invariants shown above were all computed au-
tomatically by our prototype implementation starting with the initial under-
approximation of b ≤ 0 and incrementing the upper bound by 1, each iteration.
Even on this small example, our prototype, built using µZ, is five times faster
than µZ by itself.
3 Preliminaries
This section defines the terms and notation used in the rest of the paper.
Definition 1 (Program). A program P is a tuple 〈L, ℓo, ℓe, V , τ〉 where
1. L is the set of control locations,
2. ℓo ∈ L and ℓe ∈ L are the unique initial and error locations,
3. V is the set of all program variables (Boolean or Rational), and
4. τ : L × L → BExpr(V ∪ V ′) is a map from pairs of locations to Boolean
expressions over V ∪ V ′ in propositional Linear Rational Arithmetic.
Intuitively, τ(ℓi, ℓj) is the relation between the current values of V at ℓi and
the next values of V at ℓj on a transition from ℓi to ℓj . We refer to τ as the
transition relation. Without loss of generality, we assume that ∀ℓ ∈ L  τ(ℓ, ℓo) =
⊥ ∧ τ(ℓe, ℓ) = ⊥. We refer to the components of P by a subscript, e.g., LP .
Fig. 3(b) shows an example program with L = {en, lp, er}, ℓo = en, ℓe = er,
V = {x, y, z, w, c, b}, τ(en, lp) = I, τ(lp, lp) = T , τ(lp, er) = E.
Let P =〈L, ℓo, ℓe, V , τ〉 be a program. A control path of P is a finite3 sequence
of control locations 〈ℓo = ℓ0, ℓ1, . . . , ℓk〉, beginning with the initial location ℓ
o,
such that τ(ℓi, ℓi+1) 6= ⊥ for 0 ≤ i < k. A state of P is a valuation to all the
variables in V . A control path 〈ℓo = ℓ0, ℓ1, . . . , ℓk〉 is called feasible iff there is a
sequence of states 〈s0, s1, . . . , sk〉 such that
∀0 ≤ i < k  τ(ℓi, ℓi+1)[V ← si, V
′ ← si+1] = ⊤ (2)
i.e., each successive and corresponding pair of locations and states satisfy τ .
For example, 〈en, lp, lp, lp〉 is a feasible control path of the program in
Fig. 3(b) as the sequence of states 〈(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2), (1, 100, 1, 10,
1, 2), (2, 200, 2, 20, 0, 2)〉 satisfies (2).
A location ℓ is reachable iff there exists a feasible control path ending with
ℓ. P is safe iff ℓe is not reachable. For example, the program in Fig. 3(b) is
safe. P is decidable, when the safety problem of P is decidable. For example,
the program U obtained from P in Fig. 3(b) by replacing b with 5 is decidable
because (a) U has finitely many feasible control paths, each of finite length and
(b) Linear Arithmetic is decidable.
3 In this paper, we deal with safety properties only.
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Definition 2 (Safety Proof). A safety proof for P is a map π : L→ 2BExpr(V )
such that π is safe and inductive, i.e.,
∧
π(ℓe)⇒ ⊥, ⊤ ⇒
∧
π(ℓo), ∀ℓi, ℓj ∈ L 
(∧
π(ℓi) ∧ τ(ℓi, ℓj)
)
⇒
∧
π(ℓj)
′.
For example, Fig. 5(c) shows a safety proof for the program in Fig. 3(b).
Note that whenever P has a safety proof, P is safe.
A counterexample to safety is a pair 〈ℓ¯, s¯〉 such that ℓ¯ is a feasible control
path in P ending with ℓe and s¯ is a corresponding sequence of states satisfying
τ along ℓ¯. For example, Pˆ2 in Fig. 4(b) admits the counterexample C2 shown in
(1) in Section 2.
Definition 3 (Abstraction Relation). Given two programs, P1 = 〈L1, ℓ
o
1,
ℓe1, V1, τ1〉 and P2 = 〈L2, ℓ
o
2, ℓ
e
2, V2, τ2〉, P2 is an abstraction (i.e., an over-
approximation) of P1 via a surjection σ : L1 → L2, denoted P1 σ P2, iff
V1 = V2, σ(ℓ
o
1) = ℓ
o
2, σ(ℓ
e
1) = ℓ
e
2, ∀ℓi, ℓj ∈ L1  τ1(ℓi, ℓj)⇒ τ2(σ(ℓi), σ(ℓj)).
P1 is called a refinement (i.e., an under-approximation) of P2. We say that P2
strictly abstracts P1 via σ, denoted P1 ≺σ P2, iff (P1 σ P2)∧¬∃ν  (P2 ν P1).
When σ is not important, we drop the subscript.
That is, P2 abstracts P1 iff there is a surjective map σ from L1 to L2 such
that every feasible transition of P1 corresponds (via σ) to a feasible transition
of P2. For example, if P1 is a finite unrolling of P2, then σ maps the locations
of P1 to the corresponding ones in P2. P2 strictly abstracts P1 iff P1  P2 and
there is no surjection ν for which P2 ν P1. For example, P ≺id Pˆ1, where P is
in Fig. 3(b) and Pˆ1 is in Fig. 4(a).
We extend σ : L1 → L2 from locations to control paths in the straightforward
way. For a counterexample C = 〈ℓ¯, s¯〉, we define σ(C ) ≡ 〈σ(ℓ¯), s¯〉. For a transition
relation τ on L2, we write σ(τ) to denote an embedding of τ via σ, defined as
follows: σ(τ)(ℓ1, ℓ2) = τ(σ(ℓ1), σ(ℓ2)). For example, in the definition above, if
P1 σ P2, then τ1 ⇒ σ(τ2).
4 The Algorithm
In this section, we describe Spacer at a high-level. Low-level details of our
implementation are described in Section 5. The pseudo-code of Spacer is shown
in Fig. 6. The top level routine Spacer decides whether an input program P
(passed through the global variable) is safe. It maintains (a) invariants I such
that I(ℓ) is a set of constraints satisfied by all the reachable states at location ℓ
of P (b) an abstraction A of P , (c) a decidable under-approximation U of A and
(d) a surjection σ such that U σ A. Spacer ensures that P id A, i.e., A differs
from P only in its transition relation. Let AI denote the restriction of A to the
invariants in I by strengthening τA to λℓ1, ℓ2 I(ℓ1)∧τA(ℓ1, ℓ2)∧I(ℓ2)
′. Similarly,
let UI denote the strengthening of τU to λℓ1, ℓ2 I(σ(ℓ1))∧τU (ℓ1, ℓ2)∧I(σ(ℓ2))
′.
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global(P : prog)
global(I : LP → 2
BExpr(VP ))
Spacer ( )
begin
1 A := P , I := ∅
2 (U, σ) := InitU(A)
3 while true do
4 (result, π,C ) := Solve (UI)
5 if result is Safe then
6 I = I∪ExtractInvs(A,U, π)
7 if
∧
I(ℓeP ) ⇒ ⊥ then
8 return Safe
9 (A,U) := Abstract(A,U, π)
10 (U, σ) := NextU(A,U)
else
11 (feas, A, U) := Refine(A,U,C )
12 if feas then
13 return Unsafe
Adapt(U : prog, τ : trans, σ : LU → LP )
requires(τ : transition relation on LP )
begin
14 return U [τU ← (τU ∧ σ(τ))]
NextU(A : prog, U : prog)
requires(U σ A)
begin
15 return (Uˆ , σ2) s.t. U ≺σ1 Uˆ σ2 A,
σ = σ2 ◦ σ1 and
Adapt(U, τP , σ) ≺ Adapt(Uˆ, τP , σ2)
Abstract(A,U : prog, π : proof of U)
requires(U σ A, τU = σ(τA) ∧ ρ)
begin
16 let Uˆ be s.t. LUˆ = LU ,
τUˆ ≡ σ(τˆP ) ∧ ρˆ with τP ⇒ τˆP ,
ρ⇒ ρˆ, and π is a safety proof of UˆI
17 return (A[τA ← τˆP ], Uˆ)
Refine(Aˆ, Uˆ : prog,C : cex of Uˆ)
requires(Uˆ σ Aˆ)
begin
18 feas := IsFeasible(σ(C ), P )
19 if ¬feas then
20 let A ≺id Aˆ s.t. ¬IsFeasible(σ(C ),AI)
21 U := Adapt(Uˆ, τA, σ)
22 return (false, A, U)
23 return (true, None, None)
ExtractInvs(A,U : prog, π : proof of U)
requires(U σ A)
begin
24 R : LP → 2
BExpr(VP ) := ∅
25 for ℓ ∈ LU do
26 add
∧
π(ℓ) to R(σ(ℓ))
27 for ℓ ∈ LP do
28 R(ℓ) := conjuncts(
∨
R(ℓ))
29 while ∃ℓi, ℓj ∈ LP , ϕ ∈ R(ℓj) s.t.
¬
(
R(ℓi) ∧ I(ℓi) ∧ τP (ℓi, ℓj) ⇒ ϕ
′
)
do
30 R(ℓj) := R(ℓj) \ {ϕ}
31 return R
Fig. 6: Pseudo-code of Spacer.
Spacer assumes the existence of an oracle, Solve, that decides whether UI is
safe and returns either a safety proof or a counterexample.
Spacer initializes A to P and I to the empty map (line 1), calls InitU(A)
to initialize U and σ (line 2) and enters the main loop (line 3). In each iteration,
safety of UI is checked with Solve (line 4). If UI is safe, the safety proof π is
checked for feasibility w.r.t. the original program P , as follows. First, π is mined
for new invariants of P using ExtractInvs (line 6). Then, if the invariants
at ℓeP are unsatisfiable (line 7), the error location is unreachable and Spacer
returns Safe (line 8). Otherwise, A is updated to a new proof-based abstraction
via Abstract (line 9), and a new under-approximation is constructed using
NextU (line 10). If, on the other hand, UI is unsafe at line 4, the counterexample
C is validated using Refine (line 11). If C is feasible, Spacer returns Unsafe
(line 13), otherwise, both A and U are refined (lines 20 and 21).
Next, we describe these routines in detail. Throughout, fix U , σ and A such
that U σ A.
ExtractInvs. For every ℓ ∈ L, the lemmas of all locations in LU which
map to ℓ, via the surjection σ : LU → LP (= LA), are first collected into R(ℓ)
(lines 25–26). The disjunction of R(ℓ) is then broken down into conjuncts and
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stored back in R(ℓ) (lines 27–28). For e.g., if R(ℓ) = {φ1, φ2}, obtain φ1 ∨ φ2 ≡∧
j ψj and update R(ℓ) to {ψj}j. Then, the invariants are extracted as the
maximal subset of R(ℓ) that is mutually inductive, relative to I, w.r.t. the
concrete transition relation τP . This step uses the iterative algorithm on lines 29–
30 and is similar to Houdini [16].
Abstract first constructs an abstraction Uˆ of U , such that π is a safety proof
for UˆI and then, uses the transition relation of Uˆ to get the new abstraction.
W.l.o.g., assume that τU is of the form σ(τA) ∧ ρ. That is, τU is an embedding
of τA via σ strengthened with ρ. An abstraction Uˆ of U is constructed such
that τ
Uˆ
= σ(τˆP ) ∧ ρˆ, where τˆP abstracts the concrete transition relation τP , ρˆ
abstracts ρ and π proves UˆI (line 16). The new abstraction is then obtained
from A by replacing the transition relation by τˆP (line 17).
NextU returns the next under-approximation Uˆ to be solved. It ensures that
U ≺ Uˆ (line 15), and that the surjections between U , Uˆ and A compose so
that the corresponding transitions in U and Uˆ map to the same transitions
of the common abstraction A. Furthermore, to ensure progress, NextU en-
sures that Uˆ contains more concrete behaviors than U (the last condition on
line 15). The helper routine Adapt strengthens the transition relation of an
under-approximation by an embedding (line 14).
Refine checks if the counterexample C , via σ, is feasible in the original pro-
gram P using IsFeasible (line 18). If C is feasible, Refine returns saying so
(line 23). Otherwise, Aˆ is refined to A to (at least) eliminate C (line 20). Thus,
A ≺id Aˆ. Finally, Uˆ is strengthened with the refined transition relation via
Adapt (line 21).
The following statements show that Spacer is sound and maintains progress.
The proofs of the statements are included in the appendix.
Lemma 1 (Inductive Invariants). In every iteration of Spacer, I is induc-
tive with respect to τP .
Theorem 1 (Soundness). P is safe (unsafe) if Spacer returns Safe (Unsafe).
Theorem 2 (Progress). Let Ai, Ui, and Ci be the values of A, U , and C in
the ith iteration of Spacer with Ui σi Ai and let U˙i denote the concretization
of Ui, i.e., result of Adapt(Ui, τP , σi). Then, if Ui+1 exists,
1. if Ui is safe, Ui+1 has strictly more concrete behaviors, i.e., U˙i ≺ U˙i+1,
2. if Ui is unsafe, Ui+1 has the same concrete behaviors, i.e., U˙i id U˙i+1 and
U˙i+1 id U˙i, and
3. if Ui is unsafe, Ci does not repeat in future, i.e., ∀j > i  σj(Cj) 6= σi(Ci).
In this section, we presented the high-level structure of Spacer. Many rou-
tines (InitU, ExtractInvs, Abstract, NextU, Refine, IsFeasible) are
only presented by their interfaces with their implementation left open. In the
next section, we complete the picture by describing the implementation used in
our prototype.
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5 Implementation
Let P =〈L, ℓo, ℓe, V , τ〉 be the input program. First, we transform P to P˜ by
adding new counter variables for the loops of P and adding extra constraints to
the transitions to count the number of iterations. Specifically, for each location
ℓ we introduce a counter variable cℓ and a bounding variable bℓ. Let C and
B be the sets of all counter and bounding variables, respectively, and bound :
C → B be the bijection defined as bound(cℓ) = bℓ. We define P˜ ≡ 〈L, ℓ
o,
ℓe, V ∪ C ∪ B, τ ∧ τB〉, where τB(ℓ1, ℓ2) =
∧
X(ℓ1, ℓ2) and X(ℓ1, ℓ2) is the
smallest set satisfying the following conditions: (a) if ℓ1 → ℓ2 is a back-edge,
then
(
0 ≤ c′ℓ2 ∧ c
′
ℓ2
= cℓ2 − 1 ∧ cℓ2 ≤ bℓ2
)
∈ X(ℓ1, ℓ2), (b) else, if ℓ1 → ℓ2 exits
the loop headed by ℓk, then (cℓk = 0) ∈ X(ℓ1, ℓ2) and (c) otherwise, if ℓ1 → ℓ2 is a
transition inside the loop headed by ℓk, then
(
c′ℓk = cℓk
)
∈ X(ℓ1, ℓ2). In practice,
we use optimizations to reduce the number of variables and constraints4.
This transformation preserves safety as shown below (proof in Appendix).
Lemma 2. P is safe iff P˜ is safe, i.e., if C˜ = 〈ℓ¯, s¯〉 is a counterexample to
P˜ , projecting s¯ onto V gives a counterexample to P ; if π˜ is a proof of P˜ , then
π = λℓ · {∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0  ϕ | ϕ ∈ π˜(ℓ)} is a safety proof for P .
In the rest of this section, we define our abstractions and under-approximations
of P˜ and describe our implementation of the different routines in Fig. 6.
Abstractions. Recall that τ(P˜ ) = τ∧τB . W.l.o.g., assume that τ is transformed
to ∃Σ  (τΣ ∧
∧
Σ) for a finite set of fresh Boolean variables Σ that only appear
negatively in τΣ . We refer to Σ as assumptions following SAT terminology [15].
Dropping some assumptions from
∧
Σ results in an abstract transition relation,
i.e., ∃Σ 
(
τΣ ∧
∧
Σˆ
)
is an abstraction of τ for Σˆ ⊆ Σ, denoted τˆ (Σˆ). Note that
τˆ (Σˆ) = τΣ [Σˆ ← ⊤, Σ \ Σˆ ← ⊥]. The only abstractions of P˜ we consider are the
ones which abstract τ and keep τB unchanged. That is, every abstraction Pˆ of
P˜ is such that P˜ id Pˆ with τ(Pˆ ) = τˆ (Σˆ) ∧ τB for some Σˆ ⊆ Σ. Moreover, a
subset Σˆ of Σ induces an abstraction of P˜ , denoted P˜ (Σˆ).
Under-approximations. An under-approximation is induced by a subset of
assumptions Σˆ ⊆ Σ, which identifies the abstraction P˜ (Σˆ), and a mapping
bvals : B → N from B to natural numbers, which bounds the number of itera-
tions of every loop in P˜ . The under-approximation, denoted U(Σˆ, bvals), satisfies
U(Σˆ, bvals) ≺id P˜ (Σˆ), with τ(U(Σˆ, bvals)) = τˆ (Σˆ) ∧ τB(bvals) where τB(bvals)
is obtained from τB by strengthening all transitions with
∧
b∈B b ≤ bvals(b).
Solve. We implement Solve (see Fig. 6) by transforming the decidable under-
approximationU , after restricting by the invariants to UI , to Horn-SMT [22] (the
input format of µZ) and passing the result to µZ. Note that this intentionally
limits the power of µZ to solve only decidable problems. In Section 6, we compare
Spacer with unrestricted µZ.
We implement the routines of Spacer in Fig. 6 by maintaining a set of con-
straints C as shown in Fig. 7. Initially, C is Global. Trans encodes the transition
4 More details are in the appendix.
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Global
Trans
Ei,j ⇒ τΣ(ℓi, ℓj) ∧ τB(ℓi, ℓj), ℓi, ℓj ∈ L (1)
Ni ⇒
∨
j Ej,i, ℓi ∈ L (2)
Invars
(∨
j Ei,j
)
⇒ ϕ, ℓi ∈ L, ϕ ∈ I(ℓi) (3)
Ni ⇒ ϕ
′, ℓi ∈ L, ϕ ∈ I(ℓi) (4)
Local
Lemmas
∧
ℓi∈L,ϕ∈π(ℓi)
(
Aℓi,ϕ ⇒
((∨
j Ei,j
)
⇒ ϕ
))
(5)
¬
∧
ℓi∈L,ϕ∈π(ℓi)
(
Bℓi,ϕ ⇒
(
Ni ⇒ ϕ
′
))
(6)
Assump. Lits
Aℓ,ϕ, ℓ ∈ L, ϕ ∈ π(ℓ) (7)
¬Bℓ,ϕ, ℓ ∈ L, ϕ ∈ π(ℓ) (8)
Concrete Σ (9)
Bound Vals b ≤ bvals(b), b ∈ B (10)
Fig. 7: Constraints used in our implementation of Spacer.
relation of P˜ , using fresh Boolean variables for transitions and locations (Ei,j ,
Ni, respectively) enforcing that a location is reachable only via one of its (in-
coming) edges. Choosing an abstract or concrete transition relation is done by
adding a subset of Σ as additional constraints. Invars encodes currently known
invariants. They approximate the reachable states by adding constraints for ev-
ery invariant at a location in terms of current-state variables (3) and next-state
variables (4). The antecedent in (3) specifies that at least one transition from
ℓi has been taken implying that the current location is ℓi and the antecedent in
(4) specifies that the next location is ℓi.
C is modified by each routine as needed by adding and retracting some of the
Local constraints (see Fig. 7) as discussed below.
For a set of assumption literals A, let Sat(C,A) be a function that checks
whether C ∪ A is satisfiable, and if not, returns an unsat core Aˆ ⊆ A such that
C ∪ Aˆ is unsatisfiable.
In the rest of the section, we assume that π is a safety proof of UI(Σˆ, bvals).
InitU. The initial under-approximation is U(Σ, λb ∈ B  0).
ExtractInvs is implemented by ExtractInvsImpl shown in Fig. 8. It ex-
tracts a Maximal Inductive Subset (MIS) of the lemmas in π w.r.t. the concrete
transition relation τ ∧ τB of P˜ . First, the constraints Concrete in Fig. 7 are
added to C, including all of Σ. Second, the constraints Lemmas in Fig. 7 are
added to C, where fresh Boolean variables Aℓ,ϕ and Bℓ,ϕ are used to mark every
lemma ϕ at every location ℓ ∈ L. This encodes the negation of the inductiveness
condition of a safety proof (see Def. 2).
The MIS of π corresponds to the maximal subset I ⊆ {Aℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ such that
C∪I∪{¬Bℓ,ϕ | Aℓ,ϕ 6∈ I} is unsatisfiable. I is computed by ExtractInvsImpl in
Fig. 8. Each iteration of ExtractInvsImpl computes a Minimal Unsatisfiable
Subset (MUS) to identify (a minimal set of) more non-inductive lemmas (lines 3–
6).M , on line 4, indicates the cumulative set of non-inductive lemmas and X , on
line 5, indicates all the other lemmas.Mus(C, T, V ) in Fig. 8 iteratively computes
a minimal subset, R, of V such that C ∪ T ∪R is unsatisfiable.
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ExtractInvsImpl(C,{Aℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ, {Bℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ)
begin
1 M := ∅, X := {Aℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ, Y := {¬Bℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ
2 T := X
3 while (S := Mus(C, T, Y )) 6= ∅ do
4 M := M ∪ S, Y := Y \M
5 X := {Aℓ,ϕ | ¬Bℓ,ϕ ∈ Y }
6 T := X ∪M
7 return X
Mus(C, T, V )
begin
8 R := ∅
9 while Sat(C, T ∪ R) do
10 m := GetModel(C, T ∪R)
11 R := R ∪ {v ∈ V | m(¬v)}
12 return R
Fig. 8: Our implementation of ExtractInvs of Fig. 6.
Abstract finds a Σˆ1 ⊆ Σ such that UI(Σˆ1, bvals) is safe with proof π. The
constraints Lemmas in Fig. 7 are added to C to encode the negation of the
conditions in Definition 2. Then, the constraints in Bound Vals in Fig. 7 are
added to C to encode the under-approximation. This reduces the check for π
to be a safety proof to that of unsatisfiability of a formula. Finally, Sat(C, Σ ∪
{Aℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ ∪{Bℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ) is invoked. As C is unsatisfiable assuming Σ and using all
the lemmas (since π proves UI(Σˆ, bvals)), it returns an unsat core. Projecting the
core onto Σ gives us Σˆ1 ⊆ Σ which identifies the new abstraction and, together
with bvals, the corresponding new under-approximation. The minimality of Σˆ1
depends on the algorithm for extracting an unsat core, which is part of the SMT
engine of Z3 in our case. In practice, we use a Minimal Unsatisfiable Subset
(MUS) algorithm to find a minimal Σˆ1. As we treat {Aℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ and {Bℓ,ϕ}ℓ,ϕ as
assumption literals, this also corresponds to using only the necessary lemmas
during abstraction.
NextU. Given the current valuation bvals and the new abstraction Σˆ, this
routine returns U(Σˆ, λb ∈ B  bvals(b) + 1).
Refine and IsFeasible. Let UI(Σˆ, bvals) be unsafe with a counterexample
C . We create a new set of constraints CC corresponding to the unrolling of
τΣ ∧τB along the control path of C and check Sat(CC , Σ). If the path is feasible
in P˜ , we find a counterexample to safety in P˜ . Otherwise, we obtain an unsat
core Σˆ1 ⊆ Σ and refine the abstraction to Σˆ ∪ Σˆ1. The under-approximation is
refined accordingly with the same bvals.
We conclude the section with a discussion of the implementation choices.
NextU is implemented by incrementing all bounding variables uniformly. An
alternative is to increment the bounds only for the loops whose invariants are
not inductive (e.g., [2,27]). However, we leave the exploration of such strategies
for future. Our use of µZ is sub-optimal since each call to Solve requires con-
structing a new Horn-SMT problem. This incurs an unnecessary pre-processing
overhead that can be eliminated by a tighter integration with µZ. For Ab-
stract and ExtractInvs, we use a single SMT-context with a single copy
of the transition relation of the program (without unrolling it). The context is
preserved across iterations of Spacer. Constraints specific to an iteration are
added and retracted using the incremental solving API of Z3. This is vital for
performance. For Refine and IsFeasible, we unroll the transition relation of
the program along the control path of the counterexample trace returned by
µZ. We experimented with an alternative implementation that instead validates
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each individual step of the counterexample using the same global context as Ab-
stract. While this made each refinement step faster, it increased the number
of refinements, becoming inefficient overall.
6 Experiments
We implemented Spacer in Python using Z3 v4.3.1 (with a few modifications to
Z3 API5). The implementation and complete experimental results are available
at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~akomurav/projects/spacer/home.html.
Benchmarks. We evaluated Spacer on the benchmarks from the systemc, product-
lines, device-drivers-64 and control-flow-integers categories of SV-COMP’13.
Other categories require bit-vector and heap reasoning that are not supported
by Spacer. We used the front-end of UFO [3] to convert the benchmarks from
C to the Horn-SMT format of µZ.
Overall, there are 1,990 benchmarks (1,591 SAFE, and 399 UNSAFE); 1,382
are decided by the UFO front-end that uses common compiler optimizations to
reduce the problem. This left 608 benchmarks (231 SAFE, and 377 UNSAFE).
For the UNSAFE benchmarks, 369 cases are solved by both µZ and Spacer;
in the remaining 8 benchmarks, 6 are solved by neither tool, and 2 are solved by
µZ but not by Spacer. Fig. 9 shows a scatter plot comparing Spacer with µZ
on these 369 cases. Note that, even though abstraction did not help for these
benchmarks, hurting significantly in some cases, the benchmarks are easy with
Spacer needing at most 3 minutes each.
For the SAFE benchmarks, see Fig. 10 for a scatter plot comparing Spacer
with µZ. 176 cases are solved in under a minute by both tools (see the dense
set of triangles in the lower left corner of the figure). For them, the difference
between Spacer and µZ is not significant to be meaningful. Of the remaining 55
hard benchmarks 42 are solved by either µZ, Spacer or both with a time limit
of 15 minutes and 2GB of memory. The rest remain unsolved. All experiments
were done on an Intel R© CoreTM2 Quad CPU of 2.83GHz and 4GB of RAM.
Results. Table 1 shows the experimental results on the 42 solved benchmarks
needing more than a minute of running time. The t columns under µZ and
Spacer show the running times in seconds with ‘TO’ indicating a time-out
and a ‘MO’ indicating a mem-out. The best times are highlighted in bold. The
corresponding scatter plot in Fig. 10 shows that the results are mixed for a time
bound of 300 seconds (5 minutes). But beyond 5 minutes, abstraction really helps
with many benchmarks solved by Spacer when µZ runs out of time (time-outs
are indicated by diamonds). The couple of benchmarks where Spacer runs out
of time become better than µZ using a different setting, as discussed later.
Overall, abstraction helps for hard benchmarks. Furthermore, in elev_13_22,
elev_13_29 and elev_13_30, Spacer is successful even though µZ runs out
of memory, showing a clear advantage of abstraction (this corresponds to the
5 Our changes are being incorporated into Z3, and will be available in future versions.
14 A. Komuravelli et al.
0 50 100 150
µZ (secs)
0
50
100
150
S
p
a
c
e
r
(s
e
c
s
)
Fig. 9: Spacer vs. µZ for UNSAFE benchmarks.
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Fig. 10: Spacer vs. µZ for SAFE benchmarks.
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Fig. 11: Best of the three variants of Spacer vs. µZ for SAFE benchmarks.
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Benchmark µZ Spacer
t t B af am tp Bp
(sec) (sec) (%) (%) (sec)
systemc
pipeline 224 120 4 33 33 249 4
tk_ring_06 64 48 2 59 59 65 2
tk_ring_07 69 120 2 59 59 †67 2
tk_ring_08 232 158 2 57 57 358 2
tk_ring_09 817 241 2 59 59 266 2
mem_slave_1 536 430 3 24 34 483 2
toy TO 822 4 32 44 †460 4
pc_sfifo_2 73 137 2 41 41 TO −
product-lines
elev_13_21 TO 174 2 7 7 TO −
elev_13_22 MO 336 2 9 9 624 4
elev_13_23 TO 309 4 6 14 TO −
elev_13_24 TO 591 4 9 9 TO −
elev_13_29 MO 190 2 6 10 TO −
elev_13_30 MO 484 3 11 13 TO −
elev_13_31 TO 349 4 8 17 TO −
elev_13_32 TO 700 4 9 9 TO −
elev_1_21 102 136 11 61 61 161 11
elev_1_23 101 276 11 61 61 †140 11
elev_1_29 92 199 11 61 62 †77 11
elev_1_31 127 135 11 62 62 †92 11
elev_2_29 18 112 11 56 56 †26 11
elev_2_31 16 91 11 57 57 †22 11
Benchmark µZ Spacer
t t B af am tp Bp
(sec) (sec) (%) (%) (sec)
ssh
s3_clnt_3 109 ∗90 12 13 13 73 12
s3_srvr_1 187 43 9 18 18 661 25
s3_srvr_2 587 ∗207 14 3 7 446 15
s3_srvr_8 99 49 13 18 18 TO −
s3_srvr_10 83 24 9 17 17 412 21
s3_srvr_13 355 ∗298 15 8 8 461 15
s3_clnt_2 34 ∗124 13 13 13 †95 13
s3_srvr_12 21 ∗64 13 8 8 54 13
s3_srvr_14 37 ∗141 17 8 8 †91 17
s3_srvr_6 98 TO − − − †300 25
s3_srvr_11 270 896 15 14 18 831 13
s3_srvr_15 309 TO − − − TO −
s3_srvr_16 156 ∗263 21 8 8 †159 21
ssh-simplified
s3_srvr_3 171 130 11 21 21 116 12
s3_clnt_3 50 ∗139 12 17 22 †104 13
s3_clnt_4 15 ∗76 12 22 22 56 13
s3_clnt_2 138 509 13 26 26 †145 13
s3_srvr_2 148 232 12 16 23 222 15
s3_srvr_6 91 TO − − − †272 25
s3_srvr_7 253 398 10 20 26 764 10
misc
gcnr TO 56 26 81 95 50 25
Table 1: Comparison of µZ and Spacer. t and tp are running times in seconds; B
and Bp are the final values of the bounding variables; af and am are the fractions of
assumption variables in the final and maximal abstractions, respectively.
stars in the far right of Fig. 10). Note that gcnr, under misc, in the table is the
example from Fig. 1.
The B column in the table shows the final values of the loop bounding vari-
ables under the mapping bvals, i.e., the maximum number of loop iterations (of
any loop) that was necessary for the final safety proof. Surprisingly, they are very
small in many of the hard instances in systemc and product-lines categories.
Columns af and am show the sizes of the final and maximal abstractions,
respectively, measured in terms of the number of the original constraints used.
Note that this only corresponds to the syntactic abstraction (see Section 4). The
final abstraction done by Spacer is very aggressive. Many constraints are irrele-
vant with often, more than 50% of the original constraints abstracted away. Note
that this is in addition to the aggressive property-independent abstraction done
by the UFO front-end. Finally, the difference between af and am is insignificant
in all of the benchmarks.
Another approach to Abstract is to restrict abstraction to state-variables
by making assignments to some next-state variables non-deterministic, as done
by Vizel et al. [30] in a similar context. This was especially effective for ssh and
ssh-simplified categories – see the entries marked with ‘*’ under column t.
An alternative implementation of Refine is to concretize the under-approximation
(by refining Σˆ to Σ) whenever a spurious counterexample is found. This is anal-
ogous to Proof-Based Abstraction (PBA) [28] in hardware verification. Run-time
for PBA and the corresponding final values of the bounding variables are shown
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in columns tp and Bp of Table 1, respectively. While this results in more time-
outs, it is significantly better in 14 cases (see the entries marked with ‘†’ under
column tp), with 6 of them comparable to µZ and 2 (viz., toy and elev_1_31)
significantly better than µZ.
See Fig. 11 for a scatter plot using the best running times for Spacer of all
the three variants described above.
We conclude this section by comparing our results with UFO [3] — the
winner of the 4 categories at SV-COMP’13. The competition version of UFO
runs several engines in parallel, including engines based on Abstract Interpre-
tation, Predicate Abstraction and 2BMC with interpolation. UFO outperforms
Spacer and µZ in ssh and product-lines categories by an order of magnitude.
They are difficult for 2BMC, but easy for Abstract Interpretation and Predicate
Abstraction, respectively. Even so, note that Spacer finds really small abstrac-
tions for these categories upon termination. However, in the systemc category
both Spacer and µZ perform better than UFO by solving hard instances (e.g.,
tk_ring_08 and tk_ring_09) that are not solved by any tool in the compe-
tition. Moreover, Spacer is faster than µZ. Thus, while Spacer itself is not
the best tool for all benchmarks, it is a valuable addition to the state-of-the-art
verification engines.
7 Related work
There is a large body of work on 2BMC approaches both in hardware and
software verification. In this section, we briefly survey the most related work.
The two most prominent approaches to 2BMC combine BMC with interpo-
lation (e.g., [2,26,27]) or with inductive generalization (e.g., [10,11,14,22]). Al-
though our implementation of Spacer is based on inductive generalization (the
engine of µZ), it can be implemented on top of an interpolation-based engine as
well.
Proof-based Abstraction (PBA) was first introduced in hardware verification
to leverage the power of SAT-solvers to focus on relevant facts [20,28]. Over
the years, it has been combined with CEGAR [4,5], interpolation [5,25], and
PDR [23]. To the best of our knowledge, Spacer is the first application of PBA
to software verification.
The work of Vizel et al. [30], in hardware verification, that extends PDR with
abstraction is closest to ours. However, Spacer is not tightly coupled with PDR,
which makes it more general, but possibly, less efficient. Nonetheless, Spacer
allows for a rich space of abstractions, whereas Vizel et al. limit themselves to
state variable abstraction.
Finally, Ufo [2,1] also combines abstraction with 2BMC, but in an orthog-
onal way. In Ufo, abstraction is used to guess the depth of unrolling (plus
useful invariants), BMC to detect counterexamples, and interpolation to synthe-
size safe inductive invariants. While Ufo performs well on many competition
benchmarks, combining it with Spacer will benefit on the hard ones.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we present an algorithm, Spacer, that combines Proof-Based
Abstraction (PBA) with CounterExample Guided Abstraction Refinement (CE-
GAR) for verifying safety properties of sequential programs. To our knowledge,
this is the first application of PBA to software verification. Our abstraction tech-
nique combines localization with invariants about the program. It is interesting
to explore alternatives for such a semantic abstraction.
While our presentation is restricted to non-recursive sequential programs, the
technique can be adapted to solving the more general Horn Clause Satisfiability
problem and extended to verifying recursive and concurrent programs [17].
We have implemented Spacer in Python using Z3 and its GPDR engine µZ.
The current implementation is an early prototype. It is not heavily optimized
and is not tightly integrated with µZ. Nonetheless, the experimental results on
4 categories of the 2nd Software Verification Competition show that Spacer
improves on both µZ and the state-of-the-art.
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Fig. 12: Program with a nested loop and its corresponding bounded transition con-
straints.
A Transformation of P to P˜
The details of the transformation of an input program P to P˜ by introducing
counter variables is discussed below.
First, we construct a Weak Topological Order (WTO) [9] of P , which is a
well-parenthesized total order of L, denoted <, without two consecutive open
brackets, satisfying the following condition. Let the locations within a matching
open-close bracket pair constitute a component and let the smallest location w.r.t
< in a component be its head. Let hds(ℓ) be the outside-in list of the heads of
components containing ℓ. Let ℓ1 ≤ ℓ2 ≡ (ℓ1 = ℓ2 ∨ ℓ1 < ℓ2). Then,
∀ℓi, ℓj ∈ L  τ(ℓi, ℓj) ∧ ℓj ≤ ℓi ⇒ ℓj ∈ hds(ℓi) (3)
Intuitively, < is a total order of L such that each component identifies a loop
in P , the head of a component identifies the entry location of the loop and hds(ℓ)
denotes the outside-in list of nested loops containing ℓ. Condition (3) says that
a back-edge, w.r.t <, leads to the head of a component containing the source of
the edge, denoting the start of a new iteration of the corresponding loop. For
example, Fig. 12 shows a program with two loops, an outer loop 〈ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3〉 and
an inner loop 〈ℓ2〉. One possible WTO for this program is “ℓ
o(ℓ1(ℓ2)ℓ3)ℓ
e” with
ℓ1 and ℓ2 as the heads of the two components. Without loss of generality, assume
that ℓo is always the smallest and ℓe is always the largest location of a WTO.
Bound Variables. Next, we introduce a set C of rational variables, one per
head of a component, and the corresponding partial mapping ctr : L ⇀ C.
Intuitively, ctr(ℓ) is the number of iterations (completed or remaining, depending
on whether we are counting up or down, respectively) of the component whose
head is ℓ. Also, let B be another set of rational variables, and bound : C → B be a
bijection (i.e., |B| = |C|). Informally, bound(c) denotes the upper bound of c. For
example, in Fig. 12 we have C = {c1, c2}, c1 = ctr(ℓ1), c2 = ctr(ℓ2), B = {b1, b2},
bound(c1) = b1, and bound(c2) = b2. We construct a bounded program P˜ = 〈L,
ℓo, ℓe, V ∪ C ∪ B, τ˜ 〉, where ∀ℓi, ℓj ∈ L  τ˜(ℓi, ℓj) = τ(ℓi, ℓj) ∧ τB(ℓi, ℓj), and
τB(ℓi, ℓj) is a set of constraints defined as follows, assuming cj = ctr(ℓj) and
bj = bound(cj):
Entry: ℓi < ℓj and ℓj is a head, i.e., entering a new component (e.g., E1 and
E2 in Fig. 12). Then, τB(ℓi, ℓj) contains a constraint corresponding to cj being
assigned non-deterministically.
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Re-entry: ℓj ≤ ℓi, i.e., re-entering a component via a back-edge (e.g., R1 and
R2 in Fig. 12). Then, τB(ℓi, ℓj) contains the constraint (0 ≤ c
′
j∧c
′
j = cj−1∧cj ≤
bj , i.e., it decrements cj as long as it is not zero.
Exit: ℓi < ℓj ∧ hds(ℓi) ⊃ hds(ℓj), i.e., exiting (one or more) components
containing ℓi (e.g., X1 and X2 in Fig. 12). Then, for each h ∈ hds(ℓi) \ hds(ℓj),
τB(ℓi, ℓj) contains the constraint ctr(h) = 0.
Pass-on. For each h ∈ hds(ℓj)\{ℓj}, τB(ℓi, ℓj) contains the constraint ctr(h) =
ctr(h)′. Thus, when the transition is inside a component the current value of its
counter is remembered. See τB for the transitions E2, R1 and X1 in Fig. 12.
In other words, a counter is assigned a non-deterministic initial value when
entering its component, and decremented until zero before exiting. Since the
bound variables (i.e., B) are unconstrained, P˜ and P are equivalent w.r.t. safety,
as stated by Lemma 2.
B Proof Sketch of Lemma 1
Initially, I is empty, denoting an invariant of ⊤ for every location, which is
clearly inductive. The only update to I is on line 31. As π in ExtractInvs is
a safety proof, the only invariant which can be added to ℓo is equivalent to ⊤.
For every other location, the added invariants are inductive relative to I which
follows from the failure of the condition on line 29. Thus, I remains inductive.
⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 1
If Spacer returns Safe (line 8), the condition on line 7 and Lemma 1 imply that
I is a safety proof for P . Thus, P is safe. If Spacer returns Unsafe (line 13),
a feasible counterexample has been found (line 12). Thus, P is unsafe. ⊓⊔
D Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose P˜ is unsafe and there is a feasible control path to ℓe and a corresponding
state sequence. Now, projecting the state sequence from V ∪C ∪B to V clearly
satisfies τ for every pair of locations as P˜ only strengthens the transitions with
additional constraints (τB). This gives us a counterexample for P and P is unsafe.
Now, assume that P˜ is safe with a safety proof π˜. We show that π : L →
2BExpr(V ) such that for all ℓ ∈ L, π(ℓ) ≡ {∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0  ϕ | ϕ ∈ π˜(ℓ)}
is a safety proof for P . Note that the quantifiers can be eliminated for Linear
Rational Arithmetic. It suffices to show the three conditions of Definition 2.∧
π(ℓe) ≡
∧
ϕ∈π˜(ℓe) ∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0  ϕ ≡ ∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 
∧
ϕ∈π˜(ℓe) ϕ. As∧
ϕ∈π˜(ℓe) ϕ⇒ ⊥,
∧
π(ℓe)⇒ ⊥ and the first condition is satisfied.
As ⊤ ⇒
∧
π˜(ℓo), ⊤ ⇒ ϕ for every ϕ ∈ π˜(ℓo) and in particular, ⊤ ⇒ ∀B ≥
0, C ≥ 0  ϕ. Therefore, ⊤ ⇒
∧
π(ℓo) satisfying the second condition.
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Ui Aiσi
(ρi)
Uˆi Ui+1 Ai+1≺µ σi+1
(ρˆi) (ρi+1)
Abstract(Ai, Ui, pi)
NextU(Ai+1,Uˆi)
(a) Ui is safe.
Ui Aiσi
(ρi)
Ui+1 Ai+1σi+1
(ρi+1)
Refine(Ai, Ui, Ci)
(b) Ui+1 is unsafe.
Fig. 13: Relation between two successive under-approximations Ui and Ui+1.
Let s, s′ be a pair of current and next states satisfying
∧
π(ℓi) ∧ τ(ℓi, ℓj) for
some ℓi, ℓj ∈ L. We need to prove that ∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 ϕ is true for s
′, for every
ϕ ∈ π˜(ℓj). Let b
′, c′ be arbitrary non-negative values for B,C, respectively. One
can easily show that τB(ℓi, ℓj) is invertible for non-negative values of the post-
variables and let b, c be the values of the pre-variables corresponding to b′, c′.
But then, for b, c and s, we know that
∧
π˜(ℓi) is true. Given that π˜ is a proof of
P˜ , it follows that ϕ is true for b′, c′ and s′. ⊓⊔
E Proof of Theorem 2
In the following, we sometimes refer to the components of a program P by
application, e.g., L(P ), in addition to using subscripts.
Lemma 3. Let U1 σ1 A with τ(U1) = σ1(τA) ∧ ρ1. If U1 µ U2 σ2 A with
σ1 = σ2 ◦ µ, there exists ρ2 such that τ(U2) = σ2(τA) ∧ ρ2 and ρ1 ⇒ µ(ρ2).
Proof Sketch. Let τ(U2) = σ2(τA)∧ρ (such a ρ can always be found, as τ(U2)⇒
σ2(τA)). As U1 µ U2, we have that τ(U1) ⇒ µ(τ(U2)). Together with σ1 =
σ2 ◦ µ, we obtain
σ1(τA) ∧ ρ1 ⇒ σ1(τA) ∧ µ(ρ).
Consider
ρ2 ≡ ρ ∨ λℓ
2
i , ℓ
2
j 

∨
ℓ1i ,ℓ
1
j
µ(ℓ1i ) = ℓ
2
i ∧ µ(ℓ
1
j) = ℓ
2
j ∧ ρ1(ℓ
1
i , ℓ
1
j)

 .
It can be easily shown that ρ1 ⇒ µ(ρ2). Furthermore, it can be shown, using
σ1 = σ2 ◦ µ, that σ1(τA) ∧ µ(ρ) ⇔ σ1(τA) ∧ µ(ρ2) and hence, σ2(τA) ∧ ρ ⇔
σ2(τA) ∧ ρ2. ⊓⊔
1. Ui+1 is obtained from Ui after a call to Abstract followed by NextU, as
shown in Fig. 13(a). For Uj , the figure also shows ρj in brackets such that
τ(Uj) = σj(τ(Aj))∧ρj . Abstract ensures that ρi ⇒ ρˆi and Lemma 3 guar-
antees the existence of a ρi+1 with ρˆi ⇒ µ(ρi+1). Together, ρi ⇒ µ(ρi+1).
Further, NextU requires σi = σi+1 ◦ µ. Then, U˙i µ U˙i+1, as shown below.
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τ(U˙i) = σi(τP ) ∧ ρi
⇒ (σi+1 ◦ µ)(τP ) ∧ µ(ρi+1)
⇒ µ(σi+1(τP )) ∧ µ(ρi+1)
⇒ µ(τ(U˙i+1))
To show that U˙i ≺ U˙i+1, assume for the sake of contradiction that U˙i+1 ω
U˙i. Then, as ρi ⇒ ρˆi,
τ(U˙i+1) = σi+1(τP ) ∧ ρi+1
⇒ ω(σi(τP ) ∧ ρi)
⇒ ω(σi(τP ) ∧ ρˆi)
= ω(τ(
˙ˆ
Ui))
giving us U˙i+1 ω
˙ˆ
Ui. This contradicts
˙ˆ
Ui ≺ U˙i+1 on line 16 of Fig. 6.
2. Ui+1 is obtained from Ui after a call to Refine as shown in Fig. 13(b). Again,
for Uj , the figure shows ρj in brackets such that τ(Uj) = σj(τ(Aj)) ∧ ρj .
Refine ensures that ρi = ρi+1 and σi = σi+1. These imply that τ(U˙i) ⇔
τ(U˙i+1).
3. Let Ci = 〈ℓ¯i, s¯〉. We prove the stronger statement that for every j > i, there
exist a control path ℓ¯j in Uj and a ρj such that
(a) σj(ℓ¯j) = σi(ℓ¯i), and
(b) τ(Uj) = σj(τ(Aj)) ∧ ρj , 〈ℓ¯j , s¯〉 is feasible for the transition relation ρj
but not for the transition relation σj(τ(Aj)).
In words, we show that the control path of Ci is a control path in every
future Uj (via σj) and the state sequence s¯ is feasible when restricted to ρj
but not when restricted to σj(τ(Aj)). The latter is sufficient to show that
Uj does not admit Ci.
We prove the stronger statement by induction on j. If j = i+ 1, Fig. 13(b)
shows the relation between Ui and Ui+1. Again, Refine ensures that ρi =
ρi+1 and σi = σi+1. The required control path ℓ¯j in (a) is the same as ℓ¯i.
Also, Refine ensures that τ(Aj) does not admit Ci, satisfying (b).
Now, assume that Ui satisfies (a) and (b), for an arbitrary i. We show that
Ui+1 also satisfies (a) and (b). If Ui+1 is obtained from Ui after a call to
Refine, the argument is the same as for the base case above. The other
possibility is as shown in Fig. 13(a) where Ui is safe and Ui+1 is obtained
after a call to Abstract, followed by a call to NextU. Consider ρi, ρˆi and
ρi+1 as shown in the figure.
To see that (a) is satisfied, consider the control path µ(ℓ¯i) and note that
σi = σi+1 ◦ µ (line 16 of Fig. 6).
To see that (b) is satisfied, Lemma 3 ensures the existence of ρi+1 with
ρˆi ⇒ µ(ρi+1). As s¯ is feasible along ℓ¯i for the transition relation ρi and
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hence, for ρˆi, it is also feasible along µ(ℓ¯i) for the transition relation µ(ρi+1).
Moreover, s¯ is infeasible along ℓ¯i for σi(τ(Ai+1)), as Uˆi is safe. Hence, it
remains infeasible along µ(ℓ¯i) for σi+1(τ(Ai+1)) (follows from σi+1 ◦µ = σi).
⊓⊔
